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Fiegehen v. State, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 30, 113 P.3d 305 (June 30, 2005).1
CRIMINAL LAW – JURY INSTRUCTIONS & VERDICT
Summary
An intruder entered a residence, killed one person and shot another. The victim
placed a 911 call, but within minutes, the 911 connection went dead. Sheriff's deputies
arrived at the residence shortly thereafter and found one victim alive, lying on the floor in
a pool of blood. The telephone line nearby had been cut. A body was discovered on a
deck outside.
Evidence implicated Christopher Fiegehen as the primary suspect. However, he
abruptly fled Nevada on the day of the crime. Two months later, he was stopped and
questioned by police officers in Indiana, where they apprehended him after a routine
check revealed an outstanding warrant for his arrest in Nevada for homicide. Fiegehen
eventually returned to Nevada to face criminal charges.
The State charged Fiegehen with murder with the use of a deadly weapon,
attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon, burglary while in possession of a
deadly weapon, and home invasion while in possession of a deadly weapon. The State
alleged that Fiegehen committed the murder: (1) with malice aforethought by means of a
willful, deliberate and premeditated killing; (2) in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of a burglary; or (3) in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a home
invasion. Fiegehen waived his right to a separate penalty hearing and agreed to have the
sentence imposed by the district court, if the jury found him guilty of first-degree
murder.
The State presented overwhelming evidence establishing that Fiegehen was the
assailant. The jury instructions advised the jury only on the State's three alternative
theories of first-degree murder and contained no mention of second-degree murder. The
jury was further instructed:
All verdicts returned in this case must be unanimous. In
considering Count I, murder with the use of a deadly weapon, the State
has alleged three alternative theories of first-degree murder.
You do not have to agree on the theory of murder in the first
degree, it is sufficient that each of you find beyond a reasonable doubt that
the murder, under any one of the three theories, was murder of the first
degree.
The jury found Fiegehen guilty of "murder with the use of a deadly weapon, a
category A felony."2 The jury also found Fiegehen guilty of attempted murder with the
use of a firearm, burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon, and invasion of the
home while in possession of a deadly weapon. The jury was polled, and all of the jurors

1
2

By Michael Shalmy
Fiegehen v. State, 113 P.3d 305, 308 (Nev. 2005).

1

confirmed that they were in agreement with the verdicts. Fiegehen did not object to or
further discuss the verdict at that time.
Later, defense counsel orally requested the district court to declare the verdict on
the murder count void because it failed to designate the degree of murder. The district
court denied the motion, basing its decision on the totality of the circumstances. The
district court then sentenced Fiegehen to two consecutive terms of life in the Nevada
State Prison without the possibility of parole for murder, a sentence consistent with a
finding of first-degree murder. Fiegehen appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the jury's failure to designate in its verdict
the degree of murder did not render the verdict void. The verdict satisfied the
requirements of NRS 200.030(3) because the jury's separate findings of guilt on the
charges of murder, burglary, and home invasion together established a finding of firstdegree felony murder as a matter of law. The Nevada Supreme Court confirmed
Fiegehen’s conviction in its entirety.
Issue and Disposition
Issue
Does a felony murder conviction which does not designate a degree of murder
satisfy NRS 200.030(3)?
Disposition
Yes. Felony murder is first-degree murder as a matter of law. By convicting a
defendant of felony murder the murder is automatically designated first-degree murder as
a matter of law, and the verdict is not void.
Commentary
State of Nevada Law Before Fiegehen
Nevada law provides that a jury's failure to designate the degree of murder in its
verdict renders a murder conviction fatally defective. NRS 200.030(3) provides: "The
jury before whom any person indicted for murder is tried shall, if they find him guilty
thereof, designate by their verdict whether he is guilty of murder of the first or second
degree." The law is supported by a line of cases dating back to 1875.3
In Sellers v. State, the Nevada Supreme Court rejected the argument that the
district court can look to the totality of the circumstances to assess the validity of a
murder verdict which fails to state the degree of murder.4
Subsequently, in Loveless v. State, the Nevada Supreme Court rejected the
argument that a verdict which fails to designate a degree of murder can be waived by a
defendant's failure to object or request that the jury designate the murder as first or
3
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second degree. Loveless explained that the requirement to designate the degree of murder
"is not a mere matter of procedure that the legislature has prescribed, but a substantive
law commanding an unequivocal act of the jury as part of the trial of one charged with
murder."5
Effect of Fiegehen on Current Nevada Law
In Feigehen, the State successfully argued that the Court's more recent holding in
Graham v. State6 provided a sound basis to reexamine and abandon the "rigid and
formalistic application of NRS 200.030(3)"7 as set forth in Loveless and Sellers. In
Graham, the court explained that certain categories of first-degree murder only require
proof that the murder was committed with malice (or in the case of felony murder, with
the intent to commit the enumerated felony).8 Graham observed that these types of
murders are "legislatively deemed to be murder of the first degree."9
Graham explained:
[W]hen an enumerated first-degree murder is charged . . . the
presence or absence of deliberation and premeditation is of no
consequence. Such murders do not fall within the category of murder that
can be reduced in degree by failure to prove deliberation and
premeditation. . . .
We therefore hold that it is unnecessary to instruct juries on
deliberation, premeditation, and second-degree murder when proofs in the
case can only support a theory of guilt described within one of the
specifically enumerated categories set forth in NRS 200.030(1).10
In Fiegehen, the court agreed with the State’s argument that Graham was an
appropriate starting point to reexamine the precedent addressing NRS 200.030(3). The
Court stated that the jury clearly found that Fiegehen committed the felonies underlying
the first-degree felony murder theories. Thus, the jury found appellant guilty of firstdegree felony murder as a matter of law. Such a murder does not fall within the category
of murder that can be reduced by the jury to second-degree murder. Therefore, the
district court did not need to evaluate the totality of the circumstances in determining the
significance of the verdict. A finding of first-degree felony murder can be clearly
recognized solely from the jury's verdict.
Because of the jury's separate findings of guilt on the charges of murder, burglary,
and home invasion, the fact that the jury found first-degree felony murder, as a matter of
law, is not subject to speculation. Therefore, the Nevada Supreme Court clarified its prior
precedent and held that where the verdict itself establishes a finding of first-degree
murder as a matter of law, the verdict satisfies the requirements of NRS 200.030(1).
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California Law
The Nevada Supreme Court’s holding in Fiegehen is consistent with California
law. The California Supreme Court has held that a first-degree felony murder conviction
based on a verdict that failed to expressly designate the degree of murder did not render
the verdict a nullity.11 The California court concluded that because the defendants had
not been convicted of a crime which was distinguished into degrees within the meaning
of the California Penal Code, the requirement in the code that the jury specify the degree
of murder did not apply.12 The court further concluded that the trial court's failure to
instruct the jury on offenses other than first-degree felony murder or on the differences
between the degrees of murder did not violate the code or the defendants' right to have a
jury determine questions of fact.13
The court held that the jury need not specify the degree of murder where: (1) the
prosecution's only murder theory is felony murder, which is first-degree murder as a
matter of law; (2) the trial court properly instructed the jury to return either an acquittal or
a conviction of first-degree murder; and (3) the jury finds the defendant guilty of felony
murder.14
The California Supreme Court also found that where the jury did not expressly
state that it convicted the defendant of first-degree murder, but did specify in its verdict
that it found a willful, deliberate, premeditated killing, "[t]here is no logical reason to
compel the fact finder to articulate a numerical degree when, by definition, 'first degree
[murder]' and '[willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing]' are one and the same
thing."15
Other Jurisdictions
The Nevada Supreme Court’s holding in Fiegehen is also supported by other
jurisdictions. Other courts have held that, despite statutory provisions requiring
specification in the verdict of the degree of murder, verdicts that failed to do so were not
void if only one degree of murder could have been returned.16 The California law, along
with these cases, was helpful to the Nevada Supreme Court in distinguishing Fiegehen
from cases the court had previously addressed.
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Unanswered Questions
The Nevada Supreme Court specifically limited its holding in Fiegehen. Nevada
continues to adhere to the prior precedent which precludes an analysis of the totality of
the circumstances in evaluating the validity of a murder verdict if that verdict fails to
designate the degree of murder. In all murder cases, the court must provide the jury with
verdict forms which require them to specify the degree of murder. Only where a jury
finds the defendant guilty of felony murder, can first degree murder be designated as a
matter of law.
While the Fiegehen court reaffirmed prior precedent stating that the failure to
designate the degree of murder renders a verdict void, it did not answer the question as to
whether that failure requires an entirely new trial on the merits. While that may be
assumed from the holding, the court did not clearly state it.
Conclusion
A jury's failure to designate the degree of murder does not render a verdict void if
they find the defendant guilty of felony murder. Felony murder is first-degree murder as
a matter of law, and as such, a felony murder verdict satisfies the requirements of NRS
200.030(3).
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